On June 20, 2025, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, a ruling that fundamentally redefines the interpretive authority of district courts in civil enforcement proceedings under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The case, which centered on whether unsolicited faxes sent to online fax services violated the TCPA, saw lower courts defer to an FCC order that excluded such services from the definition of a “telephone facsimile machine,” thereby reducing the plaintiff’s claims. However, the Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, definitively reversed this approach, holding that the Hobbs Act’s exclusive jurisdiction for appellate review of agency orders does not bind district courts in enforcement actions to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Instead, district courts are now empowered to independently determine the law’s meaning based on ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, granting only “appropriate respect” to the agency’s view, rather than absolute deference.

McLaughlin v. McKesson: District Courts Regain Interpretive Authority in TCPA Enforcement

The McLaughlin case arose from a class-action lawsuit alleging that McKesson Corporation sent unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the TCPA. A key dispute centered on whether faxes sent to online fax services (received via email or online portal) qualified as transmissions to a “telephone facsimile machine” under the TCPA. While McLaughlin’s lawsuit was pending, the FCC, in its Amerifactors order (2019), interpreted “telephone facsimile machine” to exclude online fax services.

Crucially, the District Court and subsequently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the Amerifactors order “a final, binding order” that dictated the court’s interpretation of the TCPA, reasoning that they lacked authority to question its validity under the Hobbs Act. This led to the decertification of the class and significantly reduced McLaughlin’s claims.

However, the Supreme Court unequivocally reversed this stance. The Court held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Instead, district courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording only appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, clarified that the Hobbs Act’s grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to courts of appeals refers to pre-enforcement declaratory judgments about the validity of agency orders, not to a district court’s independent interpretation of a statute in an enforcement proceeding to determine liability. The Court emphasized that Congress, in the Hobbs Act, did not include language (present in other statutes like the Emergency Price Control Act) that would expressly preclude judicial review in enforcement proceedings. Moreover, policy concerns regarding circuit splits and the impracticality and unfairness of requiring all potentially affected parties to bring pre-enforcement challenges within 60 days were explicitly dismissed as reasons to deny judicial review in enforcement proceedings. The Court stated there is “no good rationale for reading the Hobbs Act to require the District Court to afford absolute deference to the agency.”

A Broader Context: The Shadow of Loper Bright and the Demise of Chevron Deference

The McLaughlin decision must be understood within the broader context of the Supreme Court’s prior ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), which overruled the seminal Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. doctrine.

Historically, Chevron deference required courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administered if the statute was “silent or ambiguous” on a specific issue, provided the agency’s interpretation was “permissible” or “reasonable.” This doctrine was rooted in a presumption that Congress intended for agencies, with their subject-matter expertise and political accountability, to resolve statutory ambiguities.

However, in Loper Bright, the Supreme Court definitively stated that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. The Court ruled that courts “may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”. The core reasoning for Chevron‘s demise was that it defied the APA’s command for “the reviewing court”—not the agency—to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” The Court found the presumption of implicit delegation to agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities to be a “fiction.”. It also criticized Chevron for being unworkable, leading to inconsistent application, fostering unwarranted instability in the law, and ultimately destroying reliance interests by allowing agencies to change interpretations without statutory change.

The Combined Effect: A Sea Change for TCPA Litigation

The combination of Loper Bright and McLaughlin marks a significant departure from the historical judicial approach to FCC interpretations of the TCPA. Previously, the interplay of Chevron deference and the Hobbs Act created an extreme level of deference to the FCC’s interpretations.

• Historically (pre-Loper Bright and McLaughlin): FCC interpretations of the TCPA were often considered highly authoritative. If an FCC order was a “final order” reviewable under the Hobbs Act, challenging it in pre-enforcement appellate review was the primary avenue, and failing to do so could lead lower courts to consider themselves bound by it, as seen in McLaughlin‘s lower court rulings. Furthermore, even if not directly binding due to the Hobbs Act, Chevron deference meant that courts would likely uphold FCC interpretations of ambiguous TCPA terms if those interpretations were merely “reasonable”. This meant businesses had a narrow window to challenge an FCC rule, and a high bar to overcome if the rule was deemed a “reasonable” construction of an ambiguous statute.
  
• The New Landscape:
  
  1. Chevron is dead: Courts will no longer automatically defer to the FCC’s “reasonable” interpretations of ambiguous TCPA statutory provisions. Instead, courts will exercise their independent judgment to determine the best reading of the statute.
  2. Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in enforcement: As McLaughlin clarifies, even if an FCC order was subject to exclusive appellate review for its validity under the Hobbs Act, district courts in TCPA enforcement actions are not bound to that interpretation and must independently interpret the underlying statute.

This means that any FCC interpretation of TCPA terms—such as what constitutes an “automatic telephone dialing system” (ATDS), what qualifies as “prior express consent,” will no longer be afforded Chevron deference. Instead of merely determining if an FCC interpretation is “reasonable,” courts will now independently determine the correct meaning of these statutory provisions, applying principles of statutory interpretation. While courts may still give “appropriate respect” or “persuasive weight” to agency expertise and reasoning (Skidmore deference), they are no longer compelled to accept an agency’s interpretation simply because a statute is ambiguous.

Impact on EIA Members and Future TCPA Litigation

For e-commerce businesses, this represents a significant shift in the legal landscape:

• Challenging FCC Interpretations: Businesses facing TCPA litigation now have a stronger basis to challenge FCC interpretations of the statute in district court enforcement proceedings. For example, the Amerifactors order, which excluded online faxes from the TCPA’s scope, is no longer binding precedent on district courts, potentially reopening the door for claims related to such faxes depending on a court’s independent interpretation.
• Increased Litigation Uncertainty (Initially): In the short term, this shift may lead to increased litigation as parties test the boundaries of judicial interpretation without the stabilizing force of Chevron deference. Courts across different circuits may arrive at varying interpretations of key TCPA provisions, potentially leading to more circuit splits that will eventually require resolution by the Supreme Court.
• Opportunity for Robust Defense: Businesses now have a more level playing field when arguing against aggressive or expansive interpretations of the TCPA by plaintiffs, as courts will scrutinize the statutory language more directly. This emphasizes the critical importance of strong legal counsel to advocate for precise statutory interpretations.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Loper Bright and McLaughlin fundamentally alter the deference landscape for FCC interpretations of the TCPA. Our members should be aware that the era of “extreme deference” is over. This necessitates a proactive and adaptive approach to compliance and litigation strategy, leveraging these new precedents to advocate for interpretations that align with the clear text and intent of the TCPA. The EIA remains committed to providing the latest insights and advocating for a regulatory environment that supports the digital economy.